1. Attachments are working again! Check out this thread for more details and to report any other bugs.

The mechanics behind Junior's sale of the Iraq War

Discussion in 'Fred's House of Pancakes' started by EricGo, Feb 11, 2007.

  1. EricGo

    EricGo New Member

    Joined:
    Apr 30, 2005
    1,805
    0
    0
    Location:
    Albuquerque, NM (SouthWest US)
    Much ado is being made of the Pentagon's BS and contradictory synthesis of intelligence data that formed the bulwark of the White House's rationale for invading Iraq (WMD, Al-Qaeda connection), but less appreciated is that the White House itself set up the commitee at the Pentagon to supply the reports.

    Any wonder the reports said, what they wanted to hear ?

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206...&refer=home
    http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/a...-news-a_section

    --------
    Feith's work had the blessing of his boss, former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The operation was set up at the behest of then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz with approval from Rumsfeld, Gimble noted. By most accounts, those three officials had distrust, if not disdain, for the work of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
    -----------

    And background from Wikipedia:
    Following the declaration of victory in Afghanistan the Bush administration had started to plan for the next stage of the War on Terror. According to Kampfner “Emboldened by their experience in Afghanistan, they saw the opportunity to root out hostile regimes in the Middle East and to implant very American interpretations of democracy and free markets, from Iraq to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Wolfowitz epitomised this view.†Setting his sights on Iraq, which he had identified as a key region during his time as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Wolfowitz “saw a liberated Iraq as both paradigm and lynchpin for future interventions.†The difficulty was, as Hersh explains, “[a]fter a year of bitter infighting, the Bush Administration remains sharply divided about Iraq.â€[14] Wolfowitz had a plan to sell the war to the more skeptical members of the administration as well as the general public as he later clarified “[f]or bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.â€

    The job of finding these WMD and providing justification for the attack would fall to the intelligence services but according to Kampfner “Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz believed that while the established security services had a role, they were too bureaucratic and too traditional in their thinking.†As a result, borrowing an idea from their old Team B days, “they set up what came to be known as the ‘cabal’, a cell of eight or nine analysts in a new Office of Special Plans (OSP) based in the U.S. Defense Department.†According to a Pentagon source quoted by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker the OSP “was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States.â€[15]

    Within months of being set-up the OSP “rivaled both the C.I.A. and the Pentagon’s own Defense Intelligence Agency, the D.I.A., as President Bush’s main source of intelligence regarding Iraq’s possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaeda.†Hersh explains that the OSP “relied on data gathered by other intelligence agencies and also on information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, or I.N.C., the exile group headed by Ahmad Chalabi.†According to Kampfner the CIA had ended its funding of the I.N.C. “in the mid-1990s when doubts were cast about Chalabi’s realiability.†However, according to Kampfner, “as the administration geared up for conflict with Saddam, Chalabi was welcomed in the inner sanctum of the Pentagon†under the auspices of the OSP and “Wolfowitz did not see fit to challenge any of Chalabi’s information.†The actions of the OSP have lead to accusation of the Bush administration "fixing intelligence to support policy" with the aim of influencing congress in its use of the War Powers Act. The arguments however did prove effective and the administration continues to focus on the Hussein regime's long history of involvement with international terrorist organizations and the current predominance of Zarqawi's Al Qaeda in Iraq.

    This should be a lesson to all of the dangers inherent in a moronic president, machiavellian handlers, and skewed balance of powers come together.
     
  2. jimmyrose

    jimmyrose Member

    Joined:
    Jul 14, 2006
    646
    3
    0
    Location:
    Northern NJ
    Vehicle:
    2010 Prius
    Model:
    III
    "how to manufacture 'intelligence'"

    If one has none to speak of, then one must manufacture it, I suppose.
     
  3. rudiger

    rudiger Active Member

    Joined:
    May 11, 2006
    696
    45
    0
    Location:
    Cincinnati, OH
    Vehicle:
    2013 Prius
    Model:
    Two
    Douglas Feith (whom Tommy Franks is rumored to have called "the dumbest f**king guy on the planet"), along with Paul Wolfowitz, not only fixed the intelligence to justify the Iraq invasion to the American public, they are singularly responsible for one of the two worst decisions by Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), that being the complete 'de-Ba'athificaion' of the Iraqi government. The judgement of Feith and Wolfowitz, as descendents of Holocaust survivors, was clouded by the abhorrent memory of Nazi party members being allowed to remain in government positions during the US-supervised rebuilding of Germany after WWII. This decision, alone, completely wiped-out whatever infrastructure was left of Hussein's government. While on the surface, this would seem like a good thing, it eliminated everyone who knew how to run Iraq public services and left it to a bunch of Bush-appointed political cronies.

    The other major faux pas made by Bremer was to completely disband the Iraqi army, leaving hundreds of thousands of former Iraqi military personnel with no livelihood to join up with the insurgency. Both of these critically inept choices were made at the highest levels of the Bush administration and are/were significant contributing factors to what has deteriorated into a Vietnam-like quagmire from which the US will take years, if not decades, to recover.

    Perhaps if those individuals Bush had put in charge of the Iraq reconstruction effort (Rumsfeld and Cheney) had listened more to Powell and the State Department (whom they regarded with scorn and disdain), instead of Feith and Wolfowitz, Bremer might have been allowed to make far different, substantially more informed choices and the US occupation of Iraq would be on a more positive trajectory. In fact, the first head of the CPA, Jay Garner, was actually on the right track, but was replaced by Bremer after only three months because he knew that the reconstruction was going to take far more time than the Bush administration wanted to allow.

    Rumsfeld will go down in history as the public face of the Iraq debacle, but Feith was the behind-the-scenes, hidden ideologue pushing the theories and ideas upon which Rumsfeld and the Bush administration ultimately based many of their exceptionally poor decisions.